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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UfA~ L E D 
f'-.i Q \j, 1 u tJ,>J 
, LILLIAN FOX, 
-----------------------~·---·-··········i~~!~:--s~p·;~-~~ C.:.urt, Ut.:.h 
Plaintiff and Appellamt, 
-vs.-
ROSS N. ·T~YLOR, 
Defendant .and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial 
District in and for Salt Lake County 
HoNORABLE .,!LnoN J. ANDERSON, Judge 
GUSTIN, RICHARDS & MATTSSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff (J!I'I,(] Appellamt 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LlLLTA~ J110X. 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-v~.---· 
HOS~ N. 'l,AYLOR, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF, APPELLANT 
STATE~fENT OF FACTS 
This is a personal injury action. A jury trial resulted 
in a verdict in favor of the defendant (R. 189). A motion 
for new trial (R. 190) was overruled and denied (R. 191). 
and thiH app~al follo\\·:-:. 
On Septe1nber 30, 1958, at about 7:45 A.~L, the plain-
tiff, a pedestrian, ·was struck by an automobile driven by 
the defendant. The accident occurred just as plaintiff 
was stepping on the island in the center of Fifth South 
bPtween Tenth and Eleventh East in Salt Lake Cit~T (R. 
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22). The island separates the two lanes for east bound 
traffic from the two lanes for west bound traffic. The 
defendant was traveling east in the lane closest to the 
island (R. 118). Plaintiff was on her way from the south 
side of Fifth South to the north side of the west bound 
traffic lane to reach an automobile which was waiting 
for her at the entrance of Barbara Place to take her to 
her place of employment. The area is shown by the dia-
gram, Exhibit P 4, which is drawn to scale, and by the 
photographs P 5, 6, 7 and 8. 
Plaintiff, upon leaving her home on the west side of 
Koneta Court, walked northerly to the south curb of 
Fifth South (R. 32) where she observed defendant's auto-
mobile to the west near the Custom Furniture Store at 
approximately three-fourths of a block away (R. 23-24). 
The Custom Furniture Store is on the west side of Tenth 
East, wbich street connects with the highway upon which 
the accident occurred. The defendant had traveled north 
on Tenth East to the vicinity of point 1 on the diagram 
where he stopped for east bound traffic (R. 122), then 
1nade a reverse right-hand turn onto the south lane of 
the roadway (R. 83) where he continued southeasterly 
to the point C 1 on the diagram (R. 84). Thereafter the 
defendant turned onto the north lane for east bound 
traffic and continued until the point of impact. 
There is an unobstructed view to the east and south-
east from the point where the defendant made the right-
hand turn from Tenth East, from which point there is a 
gradual curve to the east and an uphill slope to the point 
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of the accident. When defendant made the right-hand 
turn he was approximately 460 feet west of Koneta Court. 
Plaintiff having seen defendant's automobile three-
fourths of a block away proceeded toward her destination. 
Plaintiff was struck on her left buttock (R. 23) by 
the left front fender of defendant's automobile (R. 117), 
suffering crippling and painful injuries, including com-
pound comminuted fractures of the left tibia and fibula 
(R. 38-39, 45). Plaintiff was observed by the defendant, 
immediately after the accident, to be laying "across the 
island" (R. 112), "she was huddled up, I think with one 
arm on the island and the remainder of her body possibly 
one leg on the island, and the remainder of her body 
on the curb of the island" (R. 115). 
The width of the roadway at the point of impact for 
east bound traffic is close to 31 feet. Defendant, accord-
ing to his testiinony, was traveling from 3 to 4 feet frmu 
the curb of the island (R. 117) upon which plaintiff was 
stepping. There were no automobiles to the right of 
defendant at the time of the accident (R. 117-118). The 
defendant admitted that there was no reason why he 
could not have turned to the right and onto the south lane 
of the east bound traffic if he had seen the plaintiff 50 
feet away (R. 118). He did not see plaintiff until he was 
10 feet away from her, and when asked why he did not 
see her sooner stated: "I think the glare on the wind-
shield might have obscured my vision of her," but he said 
that the glare did not obstruct his view of his lane of 
traffic (R. 118). He testified that he was traveling be-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
tween 20 and 25 miles an hour in second gear at the tune 
of the collision (R. 119). 
The defendant, a radio operator for Utah Highway 
Patrol, was on his way to the University of Utah to at-
tend an eight o'clock class. His work shift as radio oper-
ator was from eleven at night to seven in the morning. 
On the morning in question it took the defendant -l-5 
minutes from the time he left the Capitol Building to 
arrive at the scene of the accident, during which interval 
he drove to his home in the east 800 block on Fifth South, 
had a shower and breakfast ( R. 120). He disclaimed 
being tired, weary or unobserving (R. 120). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED rPON 
POINT I. 
THE REQUESTED INSTRUCTION ON THE LAST 
CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
GIVEN. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY 
ON PLAINTIFF'S DUTY TO YIELD THE RIGHT-OF-WAY. 
POINT III. 
BY IMPLICATION THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY 
INSTRUCTED THE JURY TO PLAINTIFF'S PREJUDI·CE 
THAT ALL SHE DID WAS TO MERELY GLANCE IN THE 
DIRECTION OF THE APPROACHING VEHICLE. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL. 
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THE REQUESTED INSTRUCTION ON THE LAST 
CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
GIVEN. 
The requested instruction (R. 139-140), is in the 
form suggested by instruction number 17.21 of J.I.F.r. 
The refusal of the court to give the requested instruction 
was excepted to (R. 128). It is appreciated that before 
the trial Judge can be said to be in error for his refusal 
to give the instruction it must appear from the evidence. 
viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, that 
certain conditions exist. Among the conditions are that 
the defendant, by exercising due care, would have dis-
covered the plaintiff in a helpless position of danger, and 
then, by exercising due care, should have realized the 
danger to the plaintiff, and that he then had a clear 
opportunity to avoid the accident by the exercise of ordi-
nary care and ''Tith his then existing ability. 
In Winn 'L Read, 8 Utah 2d 394, 335 P.2d 627, the 
plaintiff and defendant were traveling north on the high-
way, the plaintiff on a horse and defendant in his auto-
mobile. The trial court found that as the parties moved 
northward in the san1e direction the plaintiff caused his 
horse to move from the right-hand side of the road to the 
left-hand side, had straightened out and then proceeded 
parallel to the road for 30 rods when the accident occur-
red. The finding that the horseman had traveled for 30 
f'()d:-: on the left-hand side of the road was not supported 
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by the evidence, but nevertheless this Court stated: 
"If, as a matter of fact, the horseman, though 
on the wrong side of the road, did travel for 30 
rods, or any substantial diJstance, on the left-hand 
side of the road, then the defendant should have 
observed him and sho~tld have avoided running 
into him. If he failed so to do, he was guilty of 
negligence that was the sole proximate cause of 
the collision." (Emphasis added.) 
In the instant case the defendant should have ob-
served the plaintiff crossing the roadway and should 
have avoided running into her, even though, as a pedes-
trian, she might have been improperly crossing the road-
way. The quotation taken from the W inn case is pre-
mised upon the supposition that the plaintiff traveled a 
"substantial distance" on the wrong side of the road. 
Here we have the plaintiff in the direct line of defendant's 
vision from the time she left the south curb of Fifth 
South until she was struck at the south curb of the island 
in the center of the street. .. A.s in the Winn case, the de-
fendant should have observed plaintiff and should have 
avoided running into her. 
The defendant stated affinnatively that he did not 
see the plaintiff until she was 10 feet away, until too 
late for him to act. The defendant did not turn to the 
right where there was mnple roon1, unobstructed by any 
traffic, to pass her. A strikingly similar situation existed 
in Beckstrom v. TV£lliams (1955), 3 Utah 2d 210, 282 P.2d 
309, where the trial court refused plaintiff's request to 
submit the case to the jury on the theory of the last clear 
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chance. This ·Court held the refusal to have been erron-
eous and remanded the case with directions to grant a 
new trial. 
Also, as in the Beckstrom case, the plaintiff was in 
danger from defendant's oncoming vehicle from which 
she could not extricate herself as soon as she moved into 
the lane of traffic then being traveled by defendant. In 
the Beckstrom case the plaintiff had driven a 2¥2 ton 
tractor fron1 a private driveway into the path of defend-
ant's approaching vehicle that he saw about 325 feet away 
approaching at a high rate of speed. The defendant con-
tinued forward without reducing his speed or changing 
directions, striking the tractor broadside and causing the 
injuries complained of. As to the rule governing the 
giving of the requested instruction on the last clear 
chance doctrine the Court said: 
"In the present case the trial judge was bound 
under this rule of law to give the requested in-
struction on last clear chance only if it appears 
that reasonable men might conclude from the 
evidence most favorable to plaintiff that three 
conditions existed - (A) that plaintiff was in a 
danger from which he could no longer extricate 
himself, (B) that defendant knew, or in the exer-
cise of reasonable care should have known, that 
plaintiff was so endangered, and (C) that defend-
ant thereafter, by exercise of reasonable ca:re, 
could have avoided injuring the plaintiff." 
Under proposition (A) the Court indicated various 
situations apparent to "reasonable minds" which pointed 
to the danger from which the plaintiff could not extri-
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eate himself, among which was the proposition "that 
jumping to either side presented plaintiff no assurance 
of safety." In the instant case the plaintiff was con-
fronted by the same dilemma, i.e., in standing still, re-
treating or going forward. The danger would persist no 
matter which course the plaintiff took. The happening 
of the accident demonstrated that her forward movement 
toward the safety of the island was disastrous. We sub-
mit that the requirement of condition (A) is apparent. 
Under condition (B) it was reasoned that when the 
tractor continued forward defendant was bound to know 
that the driver of the cumbersome machine could not, 
in the few seconds required for defendant's vehicle to 
reach the spot, get out of the way and avoid an accident. 
The same reasoning would apply in this case. The plain-
tiff was moving forward across the highway in full view 
of defendant. Her forward movement implies that she 
was unaware of the close proximity of defendant's ve-
hicle. The defendant, in the exercise of due care, should 
have known that plaintiff was not aware of the danger. 
Being unaware of the danger plaintiff was helpless to 
do anything in time to avoid the accident. The evidence 
tnost favorable to plaintiff tends to show that defendant 
on the other hand had ample opportunity to know of 
plaintiff's helplessness had he been properly attentive. 
The condition is satisfied under the rule of the Beckstrom 
case if the evidence tends to show that the defendant, 
in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known 
that plaintiff is endangered, leaving the ultilnate fact to 
the jury under the proper instruction. 
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Certainly the driver of an automobile should be 
aware of the frustrations that he occasions in others 
under the circumstances that we have here. The jury 
could have reasonably believed that the defendant saw, 
or should have seen, the plaintiff when he was in the 
south lane at point C 1, or when he thereafter turned 
into the north lane, the lane nearest to the island. Point 
C 1 is approximately 220 feet from the point of impact. 
At some place between C 1 and the point of impact the 
defendant made, or in the exercise of due care should 
have made, an observation to the front and to the rear 
to determine if he could safely move from one lane to 
the other. He was either unobserving or else he deliber-
ately calculated the risk of driving between plaintiff 
·and the island. It could reasonably be said that defendant 
should have seen the plaintiff, whether he was in the north 
or south lane, within ample distance to permit him to stop 
his vehicle. 
In Morby v. Rogers, 122 Utah 540, 252 P.2d 231, and 
based upon figures frmn a publication by Utah State 
Highway Patrol, the stopping distance for a vehicle 
going 25 miles per hour, including reaction time, was 
determined to be 62.5 feet. The defendant testified that 
if he had seen the plaintiff 50 feet away he could have 
turned to the right (R. 118). 
Unlike the situation in Compton v. Ogden Union Ry. 
& Depot Co., 120 Utah 453, 235 P.2d 515, the plaintiff was 
unable "up to the moment of injury" to avoid the peril. 
:\lis~ Fox c>ould not •·at any instant up to the time she 
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was actually struck * * * by taking one step to the side, 
have avoided her injury." In the Compton case the train 
could only follow the course by which it was guided by 
the rails-the plaintiff had a choice but not the engineer. 
The solution of the predicament in the instant case was 
with the defendant, the driver of the automobile, who, in 
the exercise of reasonable care, should have known that 
plaintiff was in danger from which she could no longer 
extricate herself, and who, by his own statement, could 
have avoided the accident if he had seen her but 50 feet 
away. It would be of the gravest public concern to con-
done the conduct of the defendant, who admits that on a 
clear day and on an unobstructed highway he could not 
see an object moving within his line of vision 50 feet 
away and yet continued to move forward. The situation 
in the instant case is even more shocking because plain-
tiff had crossed the entire south portion of the two-lane 
roadway clear to the left side of defendant's car when 
she was struck by the left front fender while defendant 
was traveling at a speed not in excess, so he claims, of 
25 miles per hour. Furthermore, defendant was free to 
utilize the entire 20 foot lane for traffic at his right -
the lane in which he should have continued traveling from 
the outset. 
In rationalizing proposition (C), and again looking 
at the evidence in a light most favorable to the plain-
tiff on the propriety of the giving of the requested in-
struction, the Court in the Beckstrom case called atten-
tion to the fact that the highway was completely free of 
other traffic; that the tractor cmne to a halt leaving some 
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16 feet of hard surface to the east which the defendant 
could, as he could in the instant case, have "lawfully 
utilized, turning out the three or four feet necessary to 
miss the tractor, without any danger to himself or others. 
Had defendant both braked and turned out for the trac-
tor, the obvious and normal thing to have done, even 
less chance of mishap would have existed." The Court 
concluded: 
"It is thus well within the ambit of reason 
that the jury might believe defendant had ample 
opportunity to avoid the collision after he should 
have seen plaintiff's peril and realized that he 
was helpless to escape. *** 
"Whatever the true facts of the case, the evi-
dence viewed in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff could justify reasonable men in conclud-
ing that plaintiff was in inextricable peril, that 
defendant had sufficient reason to realize this fact 
and that defendant thereafter clearly had oppor-
tunity to avoid the collision-the elements neces-
sary for the application of the last clear chance 
doctrine. Therefore the trial court erred in re-
fusing to comply with its request to submit the 
case to the jury on that theory." 
We believe the instant case to be distinguishable 
from the recent case of 1J1arcellin v. Osguthorpe (1959), 
9 Utah 2d 1, 336 P .2d 779, which case, although adhering 
to the expressions of this Court in Graham v. Johnson, 
109 Utah 346, 166 P.2d 230, and Beckstrom v. Williams, 
supra, on the doctrine of last clear chance, held that un-
der the facts the defendant could do nothing to avert the 
collision "because his action by dimming his lights eould 
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only react through the plaintiff" and "It would have re-
quired unusual perspicacity, if not outright prescience, 
for the defendant to have presaged that an accident of 
this character was going to happen on the basis of a 
quick analysis of the factors involved." It was held that 
conjectures to the extent indicated did not satisfy "the 
requirement of last clear chance because it must exist 
with at least reasonable certainty." 
In the Marcellin case the plaintiff was driving his 
vehicle west before daylight and sideswiped the rear end 
of an automobile ·that was stalled on the right-hand side. 
of the road going west. Defendant going east had stop-
ped on his right-hand side of the road to render assist-
ance to the stalled car. There was ample room between 
the two cars for plaintiff to travel, but it was contended 
that defendant had left his headlights on high beam so 
that plaintiff was unable to see the stalled car until it 
was too late for him to avoid the collision. The conten-
tion was that defendant could have dimmed his lights 
when he saw plaintiff approaching, thus enabling plain-
tiff to see the lighted taillights of the stalled automobile. 
In the instant case the setting is entirely different 
and the defendant, in the exercise of due care, could have 
seen the plaintiff on the highway in ample time to avoid 
the collision. 
To say that plaintiff was negligent within the last 
clear chance doctrine is being charitable to the defendant. 
Fr01n all indications defendant actually pursued plain-
tiff to the curb of the island and knocked her down. Re-
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fleeting upon the record, including the photographs and 
the diagram, it is little wonder that plaintiff, notwith-
standing the shock of the impact, asked the defendant 
within five minutes of the accident: "Why did you hit 
me1 ***you swerved to hit me." (R. 116). 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY 
ON PLAINTIFF'S DUTY TO YIELD THE RIGHT-OF-WAY. 
Instruction 13 (R. 180) delineates the rules of law 
governing plaintiff's conduct "in order not to be guilty 
herself of contributory negligence." The instruction 
consists of two pages, which are out of place in the record, 
the first page being 180 and the second page being 167. 
The exceptions appear at pages 127-128. Subsection (2) 
states: 
" ( 2) A pedestrian who crosses a street at a 
point other than within a marked crosswalk or 
within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection 
shall yield the r~ght of way to all vehicles upon 
the roadway." (Emphasis added.) 
The last paragraph of the instruction (R. 167) would 
require the jury to render a verdict in favor of the de-
fendant and against the plaintiff, no cause of action, if it 
found that plaintiff failed to observe subsection (2) and 
that he'r failure proximately contributed to the happen-
ing of the collision. The instruction ignores the recipro-
cal duty of the defendant as required by subsection (a) 
of Section 41-6-80, U.C.A.. 1953, which reads: 
"Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of 
this act every driver of a vehicle shall exercise 
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due care to avoid colliding with any pedestrian 
upon any roadway and shall give warning by 
sounding the horn when necessary and shall exer-
cise proper precaution upon observing any child 
or any incapacitated person upon a roadway." 
The above section follows Section 41-6-79, U.C.A. 1953, 
and qualifies subsection (a) thereof, which reads : 
"Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any 
point other than within a marked crosswalk or 
within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection 
shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles upon 
the roadway." 
The instruction is inconsistent with Instruction 6 
(R.173), which reads: 
"The rights of a pedestrian to the use of 
public streets are the same as those of motorists-
neither greater nor less, and the same general 
duties devolve upon them.'' 
Subsection ( 3) of Instruction 13 is inconsistent with 
subsection (2). Subsection (3) states: 
"(3) A pedestrian crossing a roadway at any 
point other than within a marked crosswalk or 
within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection 
is required to exercise more care and cm.dion tha·u 
'lDOuld be requi'red in crossing in a pedestrian Ian~ 
or within an un1narked crosswalk at an interser-
tion." (E1nphasis added.) 
The instructions reflect the law of the case from 
which the jury cannot deviate. By Instrurtion 7 (R. 17 -+) 
the jn ry wa:-; told : 
"Th~ law ilnposes upon th~ driver of any YP-
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15 
hicle using a public highway, and upon a pedes-
trian, the same duty, each to exercise ordinary 
care to avoid causing an accident from which in-
jury might result. The pedestrian's duty includes 
exercising ordinary care to avoid placing herself 
or others in danger. The driver's duty requires 
him to be vigilant at all times, keeping a lookout 
for traffic and other conditions reasonably to be 
anticipated, and to keep the vehicle under such 
control that, to avoid a collision with any person 
or with any other object, he can stop as quickly 
as might be required of him by conditions that 
would be anticipated by an ordinary, prudent 
driver in like position. 
Each of these duties continues even when 
one has the nyht-of-way over the other." (Em-
phasis added.) 
In taking the exceptions the inconsistencies as point-
ed out above were expressly stated, except that InstruC-
tion 7 was not specifically mentioned. It is plain, never-
theless, that the inconsistency of Instruction 7 is inherent 
in the matters to which attention was specifically called. 
But be that as it may, the instruction overlooks the real-
ities of the situation as graphically described by this 
Court in Coombs v. Perry, 2 Utah 2d 381, 275 P.2d 680: 
"Even if a car is seen approaching, unless it 
is so positioned as to constitute an immediate 
hazard to her, she is not necessarily obliged to 
focus full and undivided attention on that particu-
lar car and so calculates her entire conduct as to 
avoid being struck by it. She need not anticipate 
that the driver will speed, fail to observe, or to 
control his car, or fail to afford her the right of 
way, or otherwise be negligent unless in due care 
she observes or should observe something to warn 
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her of such improper conduct. This is not to say 
that a pedestrian may claim a right-of-way in 
face of danger. She must of course be watching 
for automobiles or other vehicles on the street, 
particularly from the north whence traffic wa; 
most likely to come. But due care requires that 
she also keep a lookout ahead for other pedes-
trians, possible holes or obstructions in the street, 
and at least remain aware of the possibility of 
other traffic, lest she be guilty of failing to use 
reasonable care for her own safety in regard to 
other dangers. For these reasons she obviously 
is not necessarily required, and likely in due care 
cannot, give her entire attention to any one par-
ticular point of hazard. All that is required of 
her is that she use that degree of care which ordi-
nary and reasonable persons usually observe un-
der such circumstances." 
To say that a pedestrian who crosses a street at a 
point other than within a marked crosswalk or within an 
unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the 
right-of-way to all vehicles upon the roadway, and that 
if the failure to so yield proximately contributes to the 
happening of the collision is to overly simplify the rule, 
and would ordinarily mean that a pedestrian venture~ 
upon a public street at his peril, or that he must flee at 
the sight of an approaching vehicle regardless of it~ 
relative position on the highway. The meaning thus 
attributed to the instruction is reiterated and given fur-
ther impetus, if possible, by Instruction 14 (R. 181)~ 
which instructs that even though the defendant was driY-
ing too fast for existing conditions or even though he 
failed to keep a proper lookout the plaintiff is barred 
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frorn recovery if "she failed to yield the right-of-way to 
the defendant's automobile" and such failure was a proxi-
mate contributing cause of the accident. We submit that 
the use of the expression "failed to yield the right-of-
way" wiJthout more is an erroneous statement of conduct 
upon which to predicate negligence. The jury, if not 
thoroughly confused by the other and conflicting state-
Inents as pointed out, was most certainly uninstructed on 
the right-of-way rule and the reciprocal duty of the de-
fendant, all to the obvious prejudice of the plaintiff. 
POINT III. 
BY IMPLICATION THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY 
INSTRUCTED THE JURY TO PLAINTIFF'S PREJUDI·CE 
THAT ALL SHE DID WAS TO MERELY GLANCE IN THE 
DIRECTION OF THE APPROACHING VEHICLE. 
By subparagraph (1) of Instruction 13 (R. 180) the 
jury was instructed that it was the duty of the plain-
tiff in undertaking to cross the street to keep a reasonable 
and adequate lookout for automobiles using the street 
and to use reasonable and ordinary care to keep out of 
the way of such automobiles, and that it was her duty to 
look and observe whether there were any automobiles 
in such close proximity as to affect her safety and to 
continue to keep such a reasonable and prudent lookout 
as is reasonably necessary for her own protection. The 
court then made the gratuitious statement to the effect 
that such would be true even though a pedestrian is in a 
pedestrian lane and may have the right-of-way over the 
motor vehicle. The instruction then states : 
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"In this connection a mere glance in the di·rec-
tion of the approaching automobile is not suffi-
cient. The duty to look has inherent in it the 
duty to see what is there to be seen and to pay 
heed to it." (Emphasis added.) 
The exception to the instruction was that it "would 
seem to inject into the case the fact that all plaintiff did 
was merely glance in the direction of the approaching 
automobile, which the evidence does not justify;" (R. 
128). The trial judge was fully aware of the line of 
demarcation between his prerogative and that of the 
jury, such is indicated by the expression in Instruction 1 
(R. 168): 
"The court has no opinion, and does not seek 
to express any in these instructions with respect 
to what the facts are. It is your sole prerogative 
to determine the facts from the evidence." 
The error complained of was invited by defendant':' 
requested Instruction 9 (R. 150), ·which cites lllingus 1. 
Olsson, 114 Utah 505, 201 P.2d 495, in which case a 
directed verdict in favor of the defendant was sustained 
in a wrongful death action. The ·Court held that the 
evidence showed that the deceased did not look and 
neither said nor did anything to indicate that he 'vas at 
all aware of the danger presented by defendant's ap-
proaching auton1obile; he did nothing to either warn hi~ 
wife nor to rescue either himself or her from their posi-
tion of peril. "On this evidence, it must be said as a 
matter of law that deceased either failed to look, or hav-
ing looked, failed to see what he should have seen." The 
Court then said: 
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"The rights of pedestrians to the use of the 
public streets are the same as those of motorists-
neither greater or less. Hence, the same general 
duties devolve upon them. A pedestrian crossing 
a public street in a crosswalk or pedestrian lante, 
although he may have the right of way over ve-
hicular traffic, nonetheless has the duty to ob-
serve for such traffic. Clearly, decedent neglected 
that duty in this case. It follows that he was 
contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Of 
course we do not mean to imply that a mere glance 
in the direction of the approaching automobile 
would suffice. The duty to look has inherent in it 
the duty to see what is there to be seen, and to pay 
heed to it." (Emphasis added.) 
In the case at bar the trial court reviewed the evi-
dence on defendant's motion for directed verdict an:l 
denied the same (R. 124), holding in effect that plain-
tiff did more than to merely glance in the direction of 
the approaching automobile, assuming that the expres-
sion in the Mingus case, italicized above, can be distorted 
into the positive assertion now claimed for it. Once 
the court had determined that the evidence, as a matter 
of law, did not entitle the defendant to a judgment, we 
submit that the trial court could not, in its instruction, 
presume to criticize plaintiff's alleged conduct without 
giving the appearance of emphasizing what it thought to 
be the evidence, and thus encroaching upon the preroga-
tive of the jury. Furthermore, the expressions of this 
Court in Coombs v. Perry, supra, seem to disavow the 
refinement that the instruction makes. 
Once the trial court determined that the broad as-
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pects of due ca:re, or the lack of it, should he passed upon 
by the jury under a general verdict, then the jury, and 
not the court, had the sole right to determine the facts 
and what was reasonable under the circumstances. The 
expression that "a mere glance," as used in the instruc-
tion, bears the connotation that that is all the plaintiff 
did and the prejudice is obvious. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL. 
The motion for new trial (R. 190) ''ras on the follow-
ing grounds : 
'"1. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify tlw 
verdict. 
2. That the verdict of the jury is against law. 
3. Error in law occurring at the trial, including 
errors in the giving of instructions excepted 
to and errors in the failure to give requested 
instructions, the refusal of which was like-
wise excepted to." 
Aside from the errors heretofore pointed out, the 
trial court, on the motion for new trial, was given the 
opportunity to determine whether the evidence was suf- / 
ficient to support the verdict, which involves, for the 
purpose of our discussion, consideration of defendant's 
negligence as being the sole proximate cause of the aeci-
dent. 
The undisputed testilnony burdens defendant ·with 
the duty of exercising due care to avoid eolliding with 
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plaintiff even though she was crossing the roadway other 
than within a marked crosswalk or within an unmarked 
crosswalk at an intersection. Plaintiff had traveled the 
entire width of the south lane for east bound traffic, 
the lane in which defendant should have been traveling, 
in the exercise of due care, and from which he turned 
into the north lane to continue his eastward movement. 
At the time he turned from the south lane to the north 
lane he should, in the exercise of due care, have seen 
the plaintiff. He did not see the plaintiff until she was 
"10 feet away" and from the time he saw her plaintiff 
traveled directly in front of him fl. distance of at least 
the width of his automobile, and, according to his version, 
an additional 10 feet in order to reach the point where 
she was struck by the left front fender of defendant's 
automobile. The accident was caused by defendant's 
failure, in the exercise of due ca;re, to have seen the plain-
tiff sooner than he did, even though she was in plain 
view. 
The testimony of defendant that when he first saw 
plaintiff she was 10 feet to the right of the front of his 
car is incredible when one considers that defendant was 
traveling between 20 and 25 miles per hour and that, 
within the split second of time that must have elapsed 
between the moment defendant saw the plaintiff and 
the moment of the impact, plaintiff traveled the required 
distance to place her in a position to be struck by the 
left front fender. Regardless of the apparent improba-
bility of defendant's version of when he first saw the 
plaintiff, it was obvious that, in the exercise of due care, 
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he should have seen her sooner. As was said in Coombr; 
v. Perry, supra, the defendant must be deemed to have 
seen her, the Court stating: 
"It should be borne in mind that when defend-
ant was such distance away, the plaintiff was in 
the middle of the street, clearly within the angle 
of vision of where the defendant should have been 
looking, and he was obliged to know that her only 
purpose in being theTe facing west was to cr--oss 
the street. The 'must be deemed to have seen what 
was there to be seen' rule also applies to the de-
fendant; so he must be deemed to have seen her. 
When she stepped forward west of the center line 
it would be an immediate warning to him that she 
was continuing to cross and that she claimed her 
right-of-way. It therefore seems so plain as to be 
beyond question that from the distances just post-
ulated, as they reasonably could have been found 
by the jury, the defendant had ample opportunity 
to not only safely, but conveniently, slow down, 
turn to his 'right, or stop if necessary, to afford 
the plaintiff the right-of-way and avoid striking 
her." 
The occurrence of the accident cannot be ration-
alized on any premise other than the defendant's failure 
to comply with his continuing duty to keep a proper 
lookout regardless of plaintiff's position on the street. 
As the direct result of defendant's carelessness the acci-
dent happened whether plaintiff saw hiln or not, and con-
sequently her alleged failure to see did not proximately 
contribute to the cause of the accident. Again we quote 
from Coombs r. Perry, supra: 
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·•*** that if the plaintiff had looked and seen 
defendant approaching at a distance of 1-l--1 feet 
or more away, due care would not have required 
her to do anything other than to proceed forward 
on the assumption that defendant would afford 
her the right of way; and that thus her conduct 
could have been the same, and the accident could 
have happened just the same, whether she saw 
him or not; and consequently that her failure to 
see did not proximately contribute to cause the 
accident. This would be true without the testi-
Inony of the witness Burns hereinabove referred 
to, but if we consider the additional fact that he 
said the defendant was not proceeding in the 
center lane, but in the west lane, and that as he 
approached the plaintiff in the crosswalk, he 
swerved to his left and toward her, it is made 
palpably clea;r." 
The refinements of proximate cause, the sole proxi-
n1ate cause and what may have proximately contributed 
to the happening of the collision have been expressed 
1nany times by this Court. The application of those rules 
vary with each set of facts. In Winn v. Read, supra, 
it was said that if the horseman, though on the wrong 
side of the road, had traveled for any substantial dis-
tance, the defendant motorist should have observed him 
and should have avoided running into him. "If he failed 
so to do he was guilty of negligence that was the sole 
proximate cause of the collision." The simplicity of the 
statement and the realistic application of the principle 
merits emphasis. 
We submit that the relative position of defendant's 
automobile and the position of the plaintiff at the time 
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of the impact, coupled with defendant's statement that 
he did not see that which he should have seen under all 
of the circumstances, compels the finding, by the tests 
enumerated by this ·Court, that defendant was responsible 
for the collision, due solely to his failure to keep a look-
out that he was under obligation to keep. The evidence 
is insufficient to support the verdict in defendant's favor. 
CONCLUSION 
The jury, in the conscientious performance of its 
duty to accept without question the instructions of the 
trial court, was impelled by Instructions 13 and 14 to 
ignore the conduct of the defendant and to give effect to 
the erroneous connotation of the expression "to yield 
the right-of-way." The overly simplified admonition 
annihilated plaintiff's position as completely as if a 
verdict had been directed against her. Plaintiff was en-
titled to have her cause submitted to the jury by clear. 
unequivocal and correct statements of the law governing 
. the conduct of both parties, free from any expression 
from which it 1night be said that the trial court had pre-
determined any fact, the detern1ination of which it was, 
nevertheless, leaving to the jury. 
The inexcusable eonduct of the def~ndant driver, 
who admits that he did not see the plaintiff, a pedestrian, 
on an otherwis~ unoh~tructed hig-hway in broad daylight. 
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until he was 10 feet away from her, should be condemned. 
The plaintiff is fairly entitled to have a jury, properly 
instructed, pass upon the opportunity that the defendant 
had to avoid the accident under the circumstances pointed 
out above. 
The judgment appealed from should be reversed and 
the cause remanded with such instructions as to this 
Court may seem proper. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GUSTIN, RICHARDS & MATTSSON 
Attorneys for Plaimtiff and .Appellant 
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